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Genocide Case against Serbia and Montenegro
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O

n February 26, 2007, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ or the Court) issued its opinion in the Case
Concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro).1 In its first judgment interpreting the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention),2
the Court held that that the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at
Srebrenica in July 1995 amounted to genocide, but at the same
time determined that there was not enough evidence to find
Serbia directly responsible or even complicit in that genocide.
Nevertheless, in its landmark ruling, the Court also found that
Serbia had violated the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent the massacre and, later, by failing to punish those responsible for the killings in Srebrenica.
Initial reactions to the judgment were mixed. While one
paper’s headlines characterized the Court’s ruling as having
“[c]lear[ed] Serbia of Genocide,”3 another summed up the judgment as “Court Declares Bosnia Killings Were Genocide.”4
Months later, at the first international genocide conference held
in Sarajevo since the 1992–1995 conflict,5 the emotional intensity of the reactions to the judgment was palpable. While some
characterized the verdict as another “betrayal” by the international community, others lauded the Court’s judgment, claiming
it had finally to put to rest the question of whether Serbia had
orchestrated the genocide. Still others expressed disappointment
with the Court, noting that it failed to resolve many of the controversial questions raised in the case. The confusion over what
the Court’s complex and lengthy judgment actually held, and the
continuing controversy over whether the decision is a win or a
loss for either side, highlights the need for a closer reading and
more accurate understanding of the Court’s analysis.

7,000 Muslim men and boys were killed in the 1995 massacre at
Srebrenica.

Montenegro in June 2006) was responsible for mass killings and
other atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims in violation of the Genocide Convention. Specifically, Bosnia alleged
that “under the guise of protecting the Serbian population of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, [Serbia] in fact conceived and shared
with them the vision of a ‘Greater Serbia,’ in pursuit of which it
gave its support to those persons and groups responsible for the
activities which constitute the genocidal acts complained of.”6
Although Serbia disputed certain facts, such as the actual
number of deaths in Srebrenica, it did not deny that crimes were
committed during the conflict. In fact, it conceded that certain
acts could be “characterized as war crimes and certain even
as crimes against humanity.”7 However, Serbia disputed the
allegation that these acts had been committed with the requisite
genocidal intent.8 More significantly, it claimed that the acts
could not be attributed to Serbia, as they had been carried out
by the army of the Republika Srpska (VRS), the Bosnian Serb
entity that retained de facto control over a substantial part of territory after Bosnia and Herzegovina’s secession from the former
Yugoslavia.9

Background of the Case
The case, filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, alleged
that during the 1992–1995 conflict, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) (which after 2001 became known as Serbia
and Montenegro, and later as Serbia, following the secession of

Significance of the ICJ’s Opinion
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Aside from the Court’s complicated and controversial analysis of whether it had jurisdiction over Serbia, which has been
extensively addressed by other commentators, several critical
aspects of the Court’s judgment are worth mentioning from the
outset. First, the Court was limited to assessing Serbia’s responsibility for alleged acts of genocide.10 Thus, the decision does
not deal with Serbia’s responsibility for war crimes or crimes
against humanity, which the Court was careful to suggest, in
2
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Questions Raised by the Court’s Opinion

several parts of its opinion, might be established on the basis of
the evidence before it.11
Second, although the Court was not fully convinced that the
acts of violence that took place in parts other than Srebrenica
were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, members of a protected group under the Genocide
Convention,12 the judgment eliminates any doubt about whether
Bosnian Muslims suffered atrocious harms during the war. The
Court affirmed that it “has been established by fully conclusive
evidence that members of the protected group were systematically victims of massive mistreatment, beatings, rape, and torture causing serious bodily and mental harm, during the conflict
and, in particular, in the detention camps.”13
Similarly, although the Court failed to find enough evidence
to conclude that Serbia could be held responsible for genocide,
the Court’s judgment recognized that: 1) “there is much evidence of direct or indirect participation by the official army of
the FRY, along with the Bosnian Serb armed forces, in military
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years prior to the
events at Srebrenica”14 and, more significantly, 2) the “FRY was
in a position of influence, over the Bosnian Serbs who devised
and implemented the genocide in Srebrenica . . . owing to the
strength of the political, military and financial links between
FRY on the one hand and the Republika Srpska and the VRS on
the other, which, though somewhat weaker than in the preceding period, nonetheless remained very close.”15 Thus, although
the Court’s decision falls short of finding Serbia responsible
for genocide, it leaves little room for doubt that Serbia was
involved in the events leading up to and during the genocide in
Srebrenica.
Third, the Court found that a State can be held responsible for genocide without an individual being convicted of the
crime.16 Although the Genocide Convention does not expressly
require States to refrain from committing genocide themselves,
the Court concluded that States’ obligation to prevent genocide
under the Convention implies that States, not just individuals,
are prohibited from committing genocide.17 This is significant
because the Court relied extensively on evidentiary findings
made by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY or the Tribunal) in cases where individuals
had been charged with genocide,18 and that tribunal has yet to
convict any individual of committing (as opposed to aiding and
abetting) genocide.19
This leads to the final, and perhaps, most significant preliminary observation about the Court’s judgment. Not only was
this the first time since the Genocide Convention was adopted
in 1948 that the ICJ heard and issued a judgment on a dispute
over an alleged violation of the Convention, but it was also the
first time a State was actually held responsible for violating the
Convention, in particular by failing to take the necessary steps
to prevent genocide. The import of this particular ruling cannot
be overstated. According to the majority, a State need not know
that genocide is underway or is about to occur in order for the
obligation to prevent to be triggered; rather it is sufficient that
the State knew that there “was a serious risk of genocide.”20
As another commentator has pointed out, the “Court put to rest
States’ all-too-familiar claim that it is unclear whether they must
act to prevent genocide in the face of ambiguous facts that are
unambiguously menacing: If they wait until it is legally certain,
they have waited too long to prevent it.”21

Despite the landmark nature of the decision, the Court’s
analysis raises a number of critical questions which merit further
discussion. Although the judgment will likely be the subject of
much commentary in years to come, three issues in particular
stand out as worthy of note.

The Court’s Decision Not to
Seek the Best Possible Evidence
The first issue relates to the question of why the Court chose
not to use, or even seek, the best possible evidence. On two separate occasions, Bosnia requested unedited copies of documents
containing minutes of the meetings of the Supreme Defence
Council of Serbia,22 the country’s highest decision-making body
at the time of the conflict, made up of Yugoslavia’s top political
and military leadership. The documents have been characterized
as “the best inside view of Serbia’s role in the Bosnian war of
1992–1995.”23 As the Vice-President of the Court Judge Awn
Shawkat al-Khasawneh noted in his dissent, “[i]t is a reasonable
expectation that those documents would have shed light on the
central questions” facing the Court.24
Under the ICJ Statute, the Court could have asked Serbia to
produce these documents in their entirety, or at the very least
officially noted Serbia’s failure to produce uncensored copies.25
Nevertheless, the Court chose to do neither,26 noting instead that
Bosnia had “extensive documentation and other evidence available to it, especially from the readily accessible ICTY records”27
— as if, in the words of one commentator, “having access to
a mountain of less probative evidence could compensate for
evidence withheld by Serbia precisely because it was crucial to
Bosnia’s case.”28 The Court’s failure to explain why it chose not
to pursue this evidence understandably raises questions about
whether the Court had before it all the evidence necessary to
make an accurate legal determination of Serbia’s responsibility
in this case.

The Court’s Decision to Apply a High
Standard of Proof But Not to Undertake
a Cumulative Analysis of the Evidence
The second question raised by the judgment relates to the
standard of proof applied by the Court and its analysis of the
evidence under that standard. Genocide is difficult to prove,
primarily because in addition to the material act, a finding of
genocide requires proof of the specific intent to destroy the protected group.29 Specifically, “[i]t is not enough that the members
of the group are targeted because they belong to that group, that
is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something
more is required. The acts listed in [the Genocide Convention]
must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole
or in part.”30
In terms of the level of proof required to meet that standard,
the Court rejected Bosnia’s suggestion that it merely had to
prove its case on the “balance of probabilities.” Instead, the
Court relied on its earlier jurisprudence to conclude that “claims
against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be
proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.”31 The Court stated
that it had to “be fully convinced” that allegations of genocide,
or complicity in genocide, have been “clearly established.”32
Although it added that “[t]he same standard applies to the proof
3
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rape of the kind perpetrated during the Bosnian conflict could
provide circumstantial evidence of genocidal intent. 41
A similar approach could have been used to analyze whether
the massive mistreatment that the Court found had occurred in
areas outside Srebrenica, particularly in the detention camps,
could in itself have contributed to an analysis of genocidal
intent. Likewise, the Court could have used its finding that
there was “conclusive evidence of the deliberate destruction of
the historical, cultural and religious heritage of the protected
group during the period in question”42 as further evidence of
intent. Indeed, earlier in the opinion, it endorsed the proposition
made by the ICTY in the Krstić case that although the destruction of cultural and religious property cannot be considered a
genocidal act, such attacks may be considered as evidence of
intent to physically destroy the group.43 The nature of these acts,
combined with the massive scale of their destructive effect, as
well as Serbia’s own statements,44 might have been sufficient
to derive the requisite genocidal intent. However, the Court
failed to undertake a cumulative analysis of such evidence, at
least with respect to the atrocities that were committed in areas
outside Srebrenica. The Court’s failure to consider the evidence
in a holistic or collective manner is disconcerting, particularly
in light of the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the Court also
refused to draw any conclusions from Serbia’s failure to turn
over unedited copies of the Supreme Defence Council documents. As Judge al-Khasawneh observed, “[i]t would normally
be expected that the consequences of [the Court’s noting such a
refusal] would be to shift the onus probandi or to allow a more
liberal recourse to inference.” This, however, was not the position taken by the Court’s majority.

The International Court of Justice recently ruled that the Srebrenica
massacre amounted to genocide, but declined to find Serbia responsible for the event.

of attribution for such acts,” the Court appears to have adopted
an even higher standard when reviewing the facts in support
of Bosnia’s state responsibility claim, noting that it had “not
been established beyond any doubt” that Serbia had supplied
the Bosnian Serb army with aid and assistance at the time when
Serbian authorities were “clearly aware that genocide was about
to take place or was under way.”33 The question of whether this
was an appropriate application of the standard is highlighted by
the fact that four of the 15 judges dissented from the Court’s
conclusion that there was not enough evidence to find Serbia
complicit in the genocide at Srebrenica.34
A more troubling aspect of the Court’s decision is its
apparent failure to consider the evidence in a cumulative manner, leading to a more limited use of inference than arguably
required. For instance, although the Court was “fully convinced”
that the evidence established the systematic mistreatment —
including “beatings, rape, and torture causing serious bodily
and mental harm”35 — of Bosnian Muslims in locations other
than in Srebrenica, it concluded that demonstrating genocidal
intent through the “very pattern of the atrocities committed over
many communities, over a lengthy period, focused on Bosnian
Muslims” is too broad a proposition, with which “the Court
cannot agree.”36
Notably, the Court’s approach here appears to be at odds
with the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which must apply the higher
“beyond reasonable doubt” standard37 and yet has repeatedly
held that in the absence of smoking gun evidence of intent, the
Tribunal can derive genocidal intent from circumstantial evidence, including pattern evidence of abuses against the protected
group.38 Although the ICTY has cautioned that when inferential
evidence is relied upon to prove genocidal intent, the “inference
must be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence,”39 it has nonetheless indicated a willingness to consider
such evidence in its analysis of intent. For instance, in an early
decision in the case of Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, the
ICTY found that the means used to achieve the objective of what
the Tribunal termed “ethnic cleansing,” including the systematic
rape of women, tended to show that the acts were designed to
reach “the very foundations of the group.”40 The Tribunal concluded that, in combination with other factors, the systematic

The Court’s Reliance on the
Jurisprudence of the ICTY
The third question relates to the extent to which the Court
was guided by the jurisprudence the ICTY. In assessing the
parties’ claims, the Court examined a vast amount of evidence,
including UN reports, submissions from States as well as from
inter- and non-governmental organizations, newspaper articles,
and expert witnesses.45 Significantly, the Court also considered
findings of fact made by the ICTY, stating that “in principle
[they would be] accept[ed] as highly persuasive” and adding that
the ICTY’s evaluation of intent based on those adjudicated facts
was entitled to “due weight.”46
For instance, in arriving at its conclusions regarding the
absence of genocidal intent with respect to the atrocities committed in areas outside Srebrenica, the Court appears to have
been heavily influenced by judgments in which the ICTY found
genocidal intent lacking.47 Yet, at the same time, the Court seems
to have been reluctant to rely on other aspects of the ICTY’s
jurisprudence, including, as noted above, the Tribunal’s use of
circumstantial evidence to prove genocidal intent in the absence
of smoking gun evidence of such intent.48 The Court’s inconsistent approach to the relevance of ICTY jurisprudence begs
the question: if the Court did not feel persuaded to conduct the
kind of cumulative analysis of circumstantial evidence endorsed
by the ICTY, why did it fail to conduct its own analysis of the
evidence instead of relying on ICTY judgments to support its
conclusion that evidence of intent was lacking? In other words,
if it found the ICTY’s approach to the evidence unpersuasive,
why did the Court rely on the ICTY’s conclusions of fact?
4
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Unfortunately, the inconsistency in the Court’s reliance on the
ICTY’s findings and analysis can lend itself to the perception
that the ICJ had reasons other than a strictly legal interpretation
of the facts in coming to its conclusions.
Equally significant is the fact that the Court appears to
have been selective when taking into account the difference in
the nature of the cases that it and the ICTY are called upon to
decide. For instance, whereas in justifying its rejection of the
ICTY’s “overall control” test the Court highlights the difference
between the nature of state involvement required to characterize
a conflict as international and the nature of state involvement
required to give rise to state responsibility,49 it fails to mention
the distinction between the civil nature of its proceedings and
the criminal nature of the ICTY’s proceedings when using the
ICTY’s findings to support its conclusion regarding the absence
of genocidal intent.50 Citing ICTY jurisprudence in support of its
own conclusions without careful and consistent consideration of
the nature and context in which each of these courts functions
threatens to undermine the soundness of the Court’s analysis.

the ICJ’s ruling regarding Serbia’s violation of the obligation to
punish perpetrators of genocide, including by failing to turn over
ICTY indictee General Ratko Mladić to the Tribunal,52 clearly
gives the ICTY additional leverage to request that States assist it
in persuading Serbia to hand over to the Tribunal indictees who
remain at large.53 This is significant, given that the Tribunal is
expected to conclude its work by the year 2010.54
The second observation concerns the practical implications
of the evidentiary questions raised by the Court’s decision. In
light of how critical accurate and complete evidence is to the
adequate resolution of a case — as well as to the perception of
the Court’s opinion as a fair and credible adjudication of the
issues in controversy — it may be worth exploring the idea of
a separate fact-finding chamber of the Court dedicated solely to
seeking and conducting a preliminary analysis of the best available evidence.
The final observation relates to the much broader question
of whether the judgment will contribute to reconciliation in the
region. This is a question that will no doubt be debated for years
to come. One thing is clear, however, and that is the need for a
clear and precise explanation of the Court’s verdict. Although
the judgment has evoked passionate reactions on all sides, the
better understood this judgment becomes, the better the chances
that — despite the legal questions it has raised — it will contribute to some sort of reconciliation in the region.
HRB

Conclusion
Although others, including many present at the international
genocide conference held in Sarajevo,51 have addressed various
political and practical consequences of the ICJ’s judgment, a
few final observations are worth highlighting. The first is that
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See also Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No: IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶¶
33-34 (Appeals Chamber) (Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Jelisić,
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and political suppression is relaxed. He also
encouraged sustained regional involvement
with the UN to address the root causes of
unrest. The Security Council has responded
by urging the Myanmar government and its
opposition to work quickly towards reconciliation. To help with this process, the UN
dispatched Mr. Gambari to several regional
states, including China, to continue developing a consensus committed to working
for peace in Burma. Mr. Gambari was also
invited to return to Burma this November.
Additionally, the UN independent human
rights expert on Myanmar will visit Burma
to verify and report on alleged abuses during the government crackdown. The effectiveness of such steps remains to be seen,
but the currently the UN appears to have
put its faith in diplomacy rather than sanctions to encourage Burmese liberalization
and reconciliation.

Working Group Criticizes
Blackwater Shootings in Iraq
The UN Working Group on the Use
of Mercenaries (the Working Group)
expressed serious concern over the killing
of ten Iraqi civilians by private security
employees. The International Convention
against the Use, Recruitment, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries (the Convention)
entered into force in 2001 and obligates
states to regulate and control the use of
private military forces around the world.
The recent killings in Iraq have drawn

attention to the increased use of private
security forces.
The Working Group’s statement
expresses many major concerns related
to the use of private security forces and
exemplifies the international community’s
desire to regulate their use. The statement
criticizes the use of bilateral government
agreements giving private forces immunity
from prosecution for their actions. This
immunity circumvents the Convention’s
authority and weakens enforceability
of its provisions. The Working Group
calls on Member States to accede to the
Convention, to avoid granting immunity to
private forces, and to create internal monitoring mechanisms to ensure that these
forces do not violate human rights.
The privatization of security and military forces is one of the most divisive and
controversial developments associated with
economic globalization. Even some proponents worry that the growing use of these
forces represents a decline of traditional
nation-state sovereignty. For years, private
security forces have been involved in conflicts in Africa and Eastern Europe. Their
reach has now increased, however. Private
forces have even taken part in emergency
relief programs in the United States.
The private security firm Blackwater is
seeking to diversify its business by reaching out to U.S. state and local governments

that may lack infrastructure or capacity
to respond to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Blackwater, which contracted
to provide relief services in New Orleans
following 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, was
lauded for its effectiveness but condemned
for its expense. Critics also point out that
using private firms to carry out traditional
government functions carries an appearance of vigilantism and could foster a
perception that the U.S. government pays
contractors to do its job, whether by preference or necessity. This same perception
pervades reactions to U.S. use of private
forces in Iraq.
The recent killings in Iraq and the
Working Group’s response focus international attention on this debate. The potential for human rights violations during
conflict or natural disasters is high. The
Working Group and other opponents of
private forces assert that the lack of oversight and accountability of these forces
makes them more likely to violate human
rights than traditional government actors
are. Opponents see stripping these forces
of the immunity currently afforded them as
one way to reduce this potential.
HRB
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51 See supra n. 5.
52 Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 447-449.
53 Under Article 94(2) of the ICJ’s Statute, a prevailing State may
request the Security Council’s assistance in enforcing the Court’s
orders. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra n.

25, art. 94(2). Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina could also use the
judgment in an effort to get the United Nations Security Council to
enforce the ICJ’s order.
54 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503,
S/RES/1503, operative ¶ 7, 28 August 2003.
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